Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allows a court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Courts traditionally allowed a defendant to plead their affirmative defenses in general terms as long as it gave the “plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense." Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 F. App’x 442, 456 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1274).
But in the late 2000s, the Court issued a pair of decisions—Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)—that impose more onerous pleading requirements on plaintiffs than had previously existed. Under the Iqbal–Twombly heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff must (1) state each claim using short and plain sentences (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) and then (2) back those claims up with “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. If either of these prongs are missing, a defendant may file a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
As one court recently described, “In their wake, Twombly and Iqbal have provoked a frenzy of district court opinions reexamining” whether affirmative defenses must similarly meet a heightened pleading standard to survive a plaintiff’s 12(f) motion to strike. Paducah River Painting, Inc. v. McNational Inc., No. 5:11-CV-00135-R, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131291, 2011 WL 5525938 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2011). Late last month, a district court in Indiana identified a widespread split in authority among federal district courts over whether the Iqbal–Twombly heightened pleading standard for complaints similarly applies to the pleading of affirmative defenses. See generally Cottle v. Falcon Holdings Management, LLC, Cause No.: 2:11-CV-95-PRC (N.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012).
So where does your district stand on the issue? Take a look:
A. Cases declining to adopt the Iqbal–Twombly heightened pleading standard for the pleading of affirmative defenses.
1. Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-973, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98699, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009);
2. Cottle v. Falcon Holdings Management, LLC, Cause No.: 2:11-CV-95-PRC (N.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012);
3. Paducah River Painting, Inc. v. McNational Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131291 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) (“[T]here is the argument that the increased pleading standard for defendants will inevitably spawn more motions to strike by plaintiffs, a result at odds with the prevailing case law discouraging Rule 12(f)'s usage.”);
4. Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1259 (D. Kan. 2011);
5. J&J Sports Prods., Cause No. 1:10-cv-1563-WTL-TAB2011 (S.D. Ind. July 15, 2011);
6. Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051–52 (D. Minn. 2010);
7. Riemer v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 10 C 6150, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56307, 2011 WL 2110242, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2011);
8. Aros v. United Rentals, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125870, 2011 WL 5238829, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 31, 2011);
9. Chiancone v. City of Akron, No. 5:11CV337, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108444, 2011 WL 4436587, at * 3 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 23, 2011);
10. Baroness Small Estates, Inc. v. BJ's Rests., Inc., No. SACV 11-00468, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86917, 2011 WL 3438873, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011);
11. Ailey v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 3:11-CV-77, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81028, 2011 WL 3049283, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 25, 2011);
12. Michaud v. Greenberg & Sada, P.C., No. 11-CV-1015, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77521, 2011 WL 2885952, at *2 (D. Colo. July 18, 2011);
13. Merchants Commercial Bank v. Tillet, Civil No. ST-10-CV-364, 2011 V.I. LEXIS 26, 2011 WL 4703090 (V.I. Super. Apr. 20, 2011);
14. Jeeper's of Auburn, Inc. v. KWJB Enter., LLC, No. 10-13682, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53492, 2011 WL 1899195, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2011);
15. F.T.C. v. Hope Now Modifications, LLC, No. 09-1204 (JBS/JS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24657, 2011 WL 883202, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011) (“[W]hile Rule 8 requires the plaintiff seeking relief to 'show' that she is entitled to such relief, it requires the defendant asserting an affirmative defense to merely 'state' that defense.”);
16. Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 01-119, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116358, 2009 WL 4981730, at *4 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2009) ("There is no requirement under Rule 8(c) that a defendant 'show' any facts at all.");
17. Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F.Supp. 2d 893, 900–01 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (cautioning that a higher pleading standard would present an unreasonable burden on defendants who "risk the prospect of waiving a defense at trial by failing to plead it . . . and have a short amount of time to develop the facts necessary to do so . . . ." (citations omitted));
18. Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 596 (D.N.M. 2011) ("Plaintiffs can prepare their complaints over years, limited only by the statute of limitations, whereas defendants have only twenty-one days to file their answers." (citations omitted));
19. Odyssey Imaging, LLC v. Cardiology Assocs. of Johnston, LLC, 752 F. Supp. 2d 721, 725 (W.D. Va. 2010);
20. McLemore v. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08-cv-0021, 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25785, 2010 WL 1010092, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010);
21. First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs., Ltd., No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149, 2009 WL 22861, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009);
B. Cases adopting the Iqbal–Twombly heightened pleading standard for the pleading of affirmative defenses.
22. Champion Steel Corp. v. Midwest Strapping Prods., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136022 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011) (applying, without explicitly adopting, theIqbal–Twombley standard to the defendant’s affirmatively pled defense);
23. Hayne v. Green Ford Sales Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649–50 (D. Kan. 2009) (noting the similarity between FRCP 8(a)(1)’s requirement that claims for relief be set forth in “short and plain statement[s]” and FRCP 8(b)(1)(A)’s requirement that affirmative defenses be set forth in “short and plain terms”);
24. HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (underlining the goal of decreased litigation by limiting affirmative defenses to those that are plausible);
25. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O'Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48399, 2008 WL 2558015, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008) (extending the heightened pleading requirement to affirmatives defenses to discourage the use of “[b]oilerplate defenses [that] clutter the docket and, further, create unnecessary work”);
26. Castillo v. Roche Labs. Inc., No. 10-20876-CIV, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87681, 2010 WL 3027726, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2010);
27. Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63265, 2010 WL 2605179, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010);
28. CTF Dev., Inc. v. Penta Hospitality, LLC, No. C 09-02429 WHA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99538, 2009 WL 3517617, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009);
29. Tracy v. NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90778, 2009 WL 3153150, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009);
30. Cent. Laborers' Pension, Welfare & Annuity Funds v. Parkland Envtl. Group, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106848 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2011) (requiring (1) a short, plain statement of an affirmative defense providing notice to the plaintiff and court and (2) “some minimal facts to explain how each such defense applies in this case”).
So far, to my knowledge, no court of appeals has weighed in on the issue and the district courts listed above are fairly evenly divided.
[Image courtesy of travelet.com.]
Comments